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1. Introduction
The African Human Rights System was born in the context of the Organisation 
for African Unity (OAU)1 – later replaced by the African Union (AU)2 – when its 
Member States adopted the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
(henceforth: African Charter), namely the instrument that both defines the hu-
man rights to be protected and establishes the African Commission on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights (henceforth: African Commission) as the monitoring body.3 
* Ph.D. in International Law and European Union Law, University of Rome “La Sapienza”,
Faculty of Law, Department of Legal Sciences, Piazzale Aldo Moro, 5 – 00185, Rome (Italy), 
giuseppe.pascale@uniroma1.it. 
1 In 1963, the African States stipulated the Addis Ababa Charter and created the OAU for 
purposes of decolonisation, self-determination, economic development, struggle against the apart-
heid regimes, and settlement of border disputes. The OAU acted according to the principle of non-
interference in the domestic affairs of Member States, which at that time was considered dogmatic. 
As a consequence, the OAU initially rejected the possibility to create a regional human rights sys-
tem in Africa. As observed in the following paragraph, such perspective changed at the end of the 
Seventies. For detailed studies about the OAU, see B. BOUTROS-GHALI, L’Organisation de l’Unité 
africaine, Paris, 1969; G. NESI, “O.A.U. (Organisation of African Unity)”, in Digesto delle discipline 
pubblicistiche, Torino, 1995, vol. X, p. 218 ff.; G.J. NALDI, The Organisation of African Unity. An 
Analysis of Its Role, London/New York, 1999. 
2 The AU Constitutive Act was signed on 11 July 2000 in Lomé and entered into force on 21
May 2001. Nowadays, all African States are AU Members. Arts. 3 and 4 of the Lomé Act enumer-
ate the aims and principles inspiring the actions of the AU. Contrary to the OAU, the AU attributes 
great importance to international peace and security, the rule of law, good governance, democracy 
and human rights. About the AU, it is worth remembering G. MVELLE, L’Union africaine. 
Fondements, organes, programmes et actions, Paris, 2007; A. YUSUF, F. OUGUERGOUZ (eds), The Af-
rican Union: Legal and Institutional Framework. A Manual on the Pan-African Organization, Leiden, 
2012; K.D. MAGLIVERAS, G.J. NALDI, The African Union (AU), Alphen aan den Rijn, 2014. On the 
transition from the OAU to the AU, see J.D. RECHNER, “From the OAU to the AU: A Normative 
Shift with Implications for Peacekeeping and Conflict Management, or Just a Name Change?”, in 
Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 2006, p. 543 ff.  
3 The African Charter was adopted during the Eighteenth OAU Assembly of Heads of State 
and Government, which took place in Nairobi on 27 June 1981. The African Charter entered into 
force on 21 October 1986. At present, almost all African States have ratified the African Charter, 
the only exception being the Kingdom of Morocco. The latter has never ratified the African Char-
ter as a protest against the participation of the Arab Saharawi Democratic Republic in this treaty. 
However, on 31 January 2017, Morocco entered the AU. It means that Morocco will probably rati-
fy the African Charter soon. For a comment, see A. ILLUECA, S. KITHARIDIS, “The Impact of Mo-
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However, the African Commission is not the only monitoring body any longer. 
At a continental level, the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (hence-
forth: African Court) now flanks the African Commission, while at a sub-regional 
level some jurisdictional organs belonging to the African Sub-Regional Economic 
Communities have progressively extended their competence to the disputes con-
cerning the interpretation and implementation of the African Charter.  
Some problems are supposed to arise from the coexistence of so many human 
rights monitoring bodies in Africa, in absence of coordination. On the one hand, 
the relevant provisions included in the African Court Protocol and in the proce-
dural rules of both the African Commission and the African Court govern the re-
lationship between these two continental bodies. On the other, as illustrated in 
the following pages, there are no provisions coordinating them with the sub-
regional jurisdictional organs. Indeed, the effective need to regulate the coexist-
ence of the continental and the sub-regional monitoring bodies mostly depends 
on the assessment of the general judicial landscape where they are situated, 
namely the proliferation of international tribunals.4 In this paper, my aim is to 
contribute to demonstrating that, if you look at the proliferation of international 
tribunals as a positive phenomenon, the said need decreases or disappears.  
First of all, I will set the scene with an overview of the African Charter. Then, 
I will introduce the continental human rights monitoring bodies, namely the Afri-
can Commission and the African Court. Thereafter, I will focus on the develop-
ment of the human rights competence of the three most representative sub-
regional jurisdictional organs: the Tribunal of the Southern African Development 
Community (SADC), the Court of Justice of the East African Community (EAC) 
and the Court of Justice of the Economic Community of Western African States 
(ECOWAS). After ascertaining the lack of provisions governing the relationships 
between the continental and the sub-regional human rights monitoring bodies, the 
next pages will be dedicated to the search for coordination among those bodies 
and to the solutions suggested by the main legal scholars. The last paragraph will 
then scrutinise the effective need of such coordination in light of an optimistic 
perspective on the general phenomenon of proliferation of international tribunals. 
rocco’s Admission to the African Union on the Dispute over the Western Sahara”, in Opinio Juris, 
10 March 2017, available at www.opiniojuris.org.  
4 The proliferation of international tribunals is connected to the fragmentation of international 
law. Many scholars have examined both topics. Even the UN International Law Commission 
charged a Study Group, chaired by Marti Koskenniemi, to analyse in depth the problems arising 
from the fragmentation of international law and thus from the proliferation of international tribu-
nals: see Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expan-
sion of International Law. Report of the Study Group of the International Law Commission, Finalised 
by Martti Koskenniemi, UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.682, 13 April 2006. For an insightful comment on the 
just mentioned report see B. CONFORTI, “Unité et fragmentation du droit international: ‘glissez, 
mortels, n’appuyez pas!’”, in Revue générale de droit international public 2007, p. 5 ff. For refer-
ences to the most important bibliography about the proliferation of international tribunals, see the 
authors mentioned in paras. 5-7 of this essay. 
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2. The African Charter as the Main Human Rights Treaty in Africa
The African Charter plays an important role at the background of the prolifera-
tion of human rights monitoring bodies in Africa. As a matter of fact, the African 
Charter is the reference point for these bodies, since it contains the catalogue of 
the ‘fundamental’ human rights to be guaranteed at a regional level.5 Therefore, it 
is worth having a glance at this treaty.  
The African Charter was being negotiated when a new human rights aware-
ness appeared in the International Community.6 In Africa, the culmination of 
continental decolonisation and the collapse of the most oppressive regimes am-
plified such awareness.7 Furthermore, the ‘young’ African States were looking for 
a sort of legitimacy in the international arena. Nonetheless, that does not entirely 
explain the sudden proposal to stipulate a regional human rights treaty, emerged 
in 1979 and soon implemented. It is not a mere historical coincidence that during 
the administration of President Jimmy Carter (1977-1981) the US linked their 
development cooperation policy to human rights.8 In the same period, the Euro-
pean Communities adopted a similar strategy concerning ACP (African, Carib-
bean and Pacific) Countries. Then, in the Eighties, the European Institutions dis-
cussed the possibility to definitively correlate the European development cooper-
ation policy with human rights, democracy and the rule of law through a condi-
tionality clause added in the development agreements stipulated with the ACP 
Countries.9 Such situation plausibly persuaded many African States to rapidly 
5 Beyond the African Charter, other human rights treaties have been adopted in Africa. They 
do not have a general scope but deal with specific rights or vulnerable groups. See G. PASCALE, La 
tutela internazionale dei diritti dell’uomo nel continente africano, Napoli, 2017, p. 83 ff. 
6 During the second half of the Seventies, the signing of the Helsinki Final Act (1975) and the 
entry into force of the two UN Covenants on Civil and Political Rights and on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights (1976) created a general consensus about the importance of human rights in 
interstate relations. Then, at a regional level, it is worth remembering the entry into force of the 
American Convention on Human Rights (1978).  
7 The Portuguese Colonial Empire was the last one still alive in Africa in the Seventies. After its 
collapse, Angola, Guinea Bissau, Mozambique and Sao Tomé and Principe were born. The oppres-
sive regimes I am referring to are those of Idi Amin Dada in Uganda, Jean Bedel Bokassa in the 
Central African Empire and Macias Nguéma in Equatorial Guinea.  
8 In other words, the US required the African States to respect human rights in return for the 
aids received. See S.B. COHEN, “Conditioning U.S. Security Assistance on Human Rights Practic-
es”, in American Journal of International Law 1982, p. 246 ff., and H. HARTMANN, “US Human 
Rights Policy under Carter and Reagan, 1977-1981”, in Human Rights Quarterly 2001, p. 402 ff. 
9 Indeed, such debate arose after that, in 1977-1979, the European Communities had suspend-
ed the development aids previously granted to Uganda because of its responsibility for gross human 
rights violations and had declared in the aftermath that the same policy would be applied in the 
future in similar circumstances. For general overviews, see J. RIDEAU, “Le rôle de l’Union eu-
ropéenne en matière de protection de droits de l’homme”, in Recueil des cours de l’Academie de 
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stipulate and ratify the African Charter. In so doing, the African States continued 
to receive development aids by the European Communities, the UN, the US and 
some NGOs. Hence, it is now clear that they stipulated the African Charter 
above all to safeguard their interests, that is to say to make themselves sure of the 
continuity of the donations coming from abroad. As a consequence, the new hu-
man rights awareness only had a complementary function in the birth of the Afri-
can human rights system.  
The catalogue of human rights contained in the first chapter of the African 
Charter gives further evidence of the protection accorded by the African States to 
their own interests. Such catalogue is innovative in so far as it fulfils a sort of ‘cul-
turalisation’ of human rights and confers great importance upon African tradi-
tional values.10 However, not only the individuals, but above all the African States 
benefit from that. For instance, many of them interpret Art. 4 of the African 
Charter, proclaiming the right to life, as admitting the application of the death 
penalty according to African traditional legal culture.11 Then, the African Charter 
does not enshrine some human rights, like the parity between men and women as 
well as the liberty to change religion, in order to protect the religious values of 
the Northern Islamic States, qualified as cultural values.12 Moreover, the provi-
 
droit international de l’Haye 1997, vol. 265, p. 9 ff., p. 380 ff.; B. SIMMA, J.B. ASCHENBRENNER, C.
SCHULTE, “Human Rights Considerations in the Development Cooperation Activities of the EC”, 
in The EU and Human Rights, P. ALSTON (ed.), Oxford, 1999, p. 571 ff.; E. FIERRO, The EU’s Ap-
proach to Human Rights Conditionality in Practice, The Hague/London/New York, 2003, p. 41 ff.; 
A.P. PILLITU, La tutela dei diritti dell’uomo e dei principî democratici nelle relazioni della Comunità e 
dell’Unione europea con gli Stati ACP, Torino, 2003, p. 50 ff.; L. BARTELS, Human Rights Condi-
tionality in the EU’s International Agreements, Oxford, 2005, pp. 1-2, 7-15; D. D’HOLLANDER, A.
MARX, J. WOUTERS, “Integrating Human Rights in EU Development Policy: Achievements and 
Challenges”, in European Yearbook on Human Rights 2014, vol. XIV, p. 255 ff. 
10 In the fourth paragraph of the preamble to the African Charter, the African States underline 
the virtues of their historical tradition and the values of African civilisation, which inspire their 
concept of human rights. Thus R. ORRÙ, “Il sistema regionale africano dei diritti: prolegomeni a 
una vicenda evolutiva nel segno della complessità multilivello”, in Diritto costituzionale transaziona-
le, L. MEZZETTI, C. PIZZOLO (a cura di), Bologna, 2013, p. 193 ff., p. 207, writes that the African 
Charter ‘venerates’ the African traditional culture. About the same topic, see more extensively F. 
LENZERINI, “The African System for the Protection of Human and Peoples’ Rights: Pan-
Africanism, Solidarity and Rights”, in Law, Politics and Rights. Essays in Memory of Kader Asmal, 
T. MALUWA (ed.), Leiden/Boston, 2014, p. 13 ff., mainly pp. 31-33. For insightful studies on the
general phenomenon of the ‘culturalisation’ of international human rights law, see M. IOVANE,
“The Universality of Human Rights and the International Protection of Cultural Diversity: Some
Theoretical and Practical Considerations”, in International Journal of Minority and Group Rights
2007, p. 231 ff., and F. LENZERINI, The Culturalization of Human Rights Law, Oxford, 2014.
11 Indeed, Art. 4 states that no one may be arbitrarily deprived of life. The death penalty is ap-
plicable in many African States: see A.K. ABEBE, “Abdication of Responsibility or Justifiable Fear of 
Illegitimacy – The Death Penalty, Gay Rights and the Role of Public Opinion in Judicial Determi-
nations in Africa”, in American Journal of Comparative Law 2012, p. 603 ff., p. 613 ff. 
12 For comments, see R.M.K. KOUDÉ, “La liberté de religion et les garanties de protection dans 
le système africain des droits de l’homme et des peuples”, in Revue trimestrielle des droits de 
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sions dedicated to the social and cultural rights ‘oblige’ the African States to pro-
tect the ‘primacy’ of the traditional values at stake.13 Eventually, the African 
Charter contributes to proving that the ‘culturalisation’ of human rights reaches 
ambiguous outcomes when it is implemented in precarious contexts and if it is 
brought beyond certain limits.14 
Again, the catalogue of human rights included in the African Charter is inno-
vative, as it jointly proclaims civil and political rights (first generation of human 
rights) and economic, social and cultural rights (second generation of human 
rights).15 Furthermore, such catalogue recognises the social importance of peoples’ 
in Africa and includes even peoples’ rights (third generation of human rights). In-
deed, in the African human rights discourse the community is indispensable for 
the individual, so the former prevails over the latter. As a result, individuals can 
enjoy their human rights only if peoples’ rights are respected and implemented.16  
Anyway, in the African Charter a definition of the notion of ‘peoples’ is miss-
ing.17 The African States take advantage from such omission. First of all, the en-
 
l’homme 2014, p. 819 ff., who underlines that the protection of the religious values was useful to 
promote the ratification of the African Charter by the African Islamic Countries. 
13 For instance, Art. 17 provides that individuals shall benefit from the right to education (para. 
1) and take part in the cultural life of their community (para. 2), but then it adds that States Parties
have the duty to promote and protect the traditional values (para. 3). Similarly, according to Art.
18, the State shall take care of the physical and moral health of the family (para. 1), but then it shall
assist the family as it is the custodian of traditional values (para. 2).
14 For in-depth analysis, see M. BENCHIKH, “Sous-dévelopment et spécificité culturelle dans la 
justification de l’État autoritaire”, in Annuaire de l’Afrique du Nord, vol. XXXII, 1995, p. 51 ff., 
and ID., “Souveraineté des États, droits de peuples à l’auto-détermination et droits humains”, in 
L’homme dans la société internationale. Mélanges en hommage au Professeur Paul Tavernier, J.F. 
AKANDJI-KOMBÉ (sous la direction de), Bruxelles, 2013, p. 3 ff. 
15 It is known that, with very limited exceptions, both the European Convention on Human 
Rights and the American Convention on Human Rights do not proclaim economic, social and cul-
tural rights. Two ad hoc treaties (respectively, the European Social Charter, adopted in 1961 and 
reformed in 1996, and the San Salvador Protocol, adopted in 1988) enshrine the second generation 
of human rights and institute the pertaining monitoring organs.  
16 See the fifth paragraph of the preamble to the African Charter. Also see J. SUMMERS, Peoples 
and International Law, Leiden, 2013, p. 368 ff., and A. YUSUF, “The Progressive Development of 
Peoples’ Rights in the African Charter and in the Case Law of the African Commission on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights”, in International Law for Common Goods. Normative Perspectives on Human 
Rights, Culture and Nature, F. LENZERINI, A. F. VRDOLJAK (eds), Oxford/Portland, 2014, p. 41 ff., 
mainly pp. 41-42. 
17 The African Commission confirmed that the African States deliberately avoided to clarify the 
notion of ‘peoples’ in the African Charter because of the tragic history of racial and ethnic bigotry 
demonstrated by the dominant groups during the colonial and apartheid rule: see Sudan Human 
Rights Organisation and Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions (COHRE) v. The Sudan, Commu-
nications no. 279/03 and 296/05, Report of 29 May 2009, paras. 221-222. So, as observed by F. 
OUGUERGOUZ, The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights: A Comprehensive Agenda for 
Human Dignity and Sustainable Democracy in Africa, The Hague, 2003, p. 211, the term ‘peoples’, 
as used in the African Charter, is a ‘chameleon-like term’ that varies in nature according to the right 
it refers to.  
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forcement of peoples’ rights is not possible if the ultimate beneficiaries of such 
rights are not exactly known. What is more, the African States could interpret 
peoples’ rights in order to justify some isolated human rights violations, other-
wise contrasting with the African Charter. Some scholars have tried to give a def-
inition of the notion of ‘peoples’ in the African Charter.18 The African Commis-
sion has intervened in the question too.19 In particular, in the report issued in the 
case Legal Resources Foundation, it asserted that peoples are human groups made 
up of individuals with the same social and cultural features, such as common an-
cestry, ethnic origin, language or cultural habits.20 However, this definition does 
not correspond to the one emerging from the periodic reports that the African 
States send to the African Commission according to Art. 62 of the African Char-
ter.21 As a matter of fact, many African States identify the ‘peoples’ with their 
whole national population.22 The main consequence is that the ultimate benefi-
ciaries of peoples’ rights, namely the whole national populations, overlap the en-
tities which have to implement peoples’ rights, namely the States.  
Even the structural frame of the African Charter discloses the intention of the 
African States to safeguard their own interests. Suffice it to have a look at the 
rules dealing with the exclusion, suspension and limitation of the effects of the 
human rights to be protected. Firstly, the African States appended a very scarce 
18 See S. K.N. BLAY, “Changing African Perspectives on the Right to Self-Determination in the 
Wake of the Banjul Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights”, in Journal of African Law 1985, p. 147 
ff., pp. 158-159; R.N. KIWANUKA, “The Meaning of ‘People’ in the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights”, in American Journal of International Law 1988, p. 80 ff., p. 97; M. MUBIALA, Le 
système régional africain de protection des droits de l’homme, Bruxelles, 2005, p. 36; S.A. DERSSO, 
“The Jurisprudence of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights with Respect to 
Peoples’ Rights”, in African Human Rights Law Journal 2006, p. 358 ff., p. 362; A. YUSUF, “The 
Progressive Development”, cit., pp. 45-46. 
19 See Congrès du Peuple Katangais v. Zaïre, Communication no. 75/1992, Report of 22 March 
1995, paras. 3-6; Malawi Africa Association, Amnesty International, Sarr Diop, Union Interafricaine 
des Droits de l’Homme et RADDH, Collectif des Veuves et Ayants-Droit, Association Mauritanienne 
des Droits de l’Homme v. Mauritanie, Communications no. 54/91, 61/91, 96/93, 98/93, 164/97, 
196/97 and 210/98, Report of 11 May 2000, paras. 140-142; Kevin Mgwanga Gunme and Others v. 
Cameroon, Communication no. 266/03, Report of 27 May 2009, para. 179; Centre for Minority 
Rights Development and Minority Rights Group (on Behalf of Endorois Welfare Council) v. Kenya, 
Communication no. 276/03, Report of 29 November 2009, para. 162. 
20 See Legal Resources Foundation v. Zambia, Communication no. 211/1998, Report of 7 May 
2001, para. 73. Such interpretation is consistent with the UNESCO Declaration New Reflections on 
the Concept of Peoples’ Rights, elaborated during the International Meeting of Experts on Peoples’ 
Rights, held in Paris in November 1989, available in Human Rights Law Journal 1990, pp. 446-447. 
21 Art. 62 of the African Charter provides that every two years the States Parties shall submit a 
report on the measures taken to give effect to the African Charter in their domestic orders. 
22 See the first Report of South Africa, 1998, pp. 88-89; the first Report of Burkina Faso, 2003, 
p. 68; the fourth-ninth Reports of Tunisia, 2006, p. 106; the first-fourth Reports of Ethiopia, 2008,
pp. 120-123; the third Report of Nigeria, 2008, p. 80; the ninth-tenth Reports of Rwanda, 2009, p.
63; the second Report of Burundi, 2010, p. 48; the fourth-fifth Reports of The Sudan, 2012, pp. 50-
51. All the reports are available at the website of the African Commission, www.achpr.org.
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number of reservations to the African Charter.23 Secondly, they did not incorpo-
rate a derogation clause to be invoked in emergency situations in the African 
Charter.24 In this regard, the African Commission clearly declared that «[t]he Af-
rican Charter, unlike other human rights instruments, does not allow for States 
Parties to derogate from their treaty obligations during emergency situations. 
Thus, even a civil war in Chad cannot be used as an excuse by the State violating 
or permitting violations of rights in the African Charter».25 All that does not en-
tail that the African States can never exclude or suspend the effects of the human 
rights enshrined in the African Charter. They can apply the many claw-back 
clauses disseminated in the African Charter. In principle, a claw-back clause 
should only regulate the limitation of the domestic effects of the specific human 
right it is referred to.26 However, due to their broad formulation,27 the claw-back 
clauses contained in the African Charter also allow the African States to reach 
very similar consequences to those deriving from the application of a reservation 
or a derogation clause. 
3. The Continental Human Rights Monitoring Bodies
23 Only Egypt, South Africa and Zambia appended reservations to the African Charter. These 
reservations can be read at the website of the African Commission. 
24 A derogation clause is present in the main human rights treaties: see Art. 15 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights, Art. 27 of the American Convention on Human Rights and Art. 4 of 
the UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. On the absence of a similar clause in the African 
Charter, see M. DIOP, “The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights and the Inviolability of 
the Fundamental Rights”, in Droit intangibles et états d’exception, D. PRÉMONT, C. STENERSEN, C.
OSEREDCZUK (sous la direction de), Bruxelles, 1996, p. 421 ff., and L. SERMET, “The Absence of a 
Derogation Clause from the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights. A Critical Discus-
sion”, in African Human Rights Law Journal 2007, p. 142 ff.  
25 See Commission Nationale des Droits de l’Homme et des Libertés v. Tchad, Communication 
no. 74/92, Report of 11 October 1995, para. 21. The Commission confirmed such position in many 
following reports. Indeed, the absence of a derogation clause in the African Charter gives another 
example of the attempt of the African States to defend their own interests. In a nutshell, since a 
derogation clause is missing in the African Charter, in circumstances of public emergency the Afri-
can States are free to act without any condition, even suspending the core rights codified in the Af-
rican Charter. For specifications, see G. PASCALE, La tutela internazionale, cit., p. 118 ff. 
26 The distinction between the derogation clause and the claw-back clauses is highlighted by R. 
HIGGINS, “Derogations under Human Rights Treaties”, in British Yearbook of International Law 
1976-1977, vol. XLVIII, p. 281 ff. Also see I. VIARENGO, “Deroghe e restrizioni alla tutela dei dirit-
ti umani nei sistemi internazionali di garanzia”, in Rivista di diritto internazionale 2005, p. 955 ff. 
27 Examples of the broad formulation of the claw-back clauses in the African Charter are given 
by Art. 6, which protects the right to liberty and personal security «except for reasons and conditions 
previously laid down by law», and by Art. 9, para. 2, which provides that individuals shall have the 
right to express and disseminate their opinions «within the law». According to M. HANSUNGULE, 
“The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights”, in The African Union: Legal and Institutional 
Framework, cit., p. 417 ff., p. 424, these claw-back clauses are so broad as to leave nothing but a 
‘mere skeleton’ of the right to be protected. 
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In order to focus on the proliferation of human rights monitoring bodies in Afri-
ca and on the effective need of coordination among them, it is necessary to pre-
liminary dwell on the general peculiarities of such bodies. To this end, the cur-
rent paragraph is dedicated to the continental human rights bodies, while the fol-
lowing will deal with the sub-regional human rights bodies. 
The human rights monitoring mechanism created in Africa at a continental 
level draws inspiration from that previously operating in the European Human 
Rights System and from that still existing in the Inter-American Human Rights 
System. It is made up of an international ‘quasi-jurisdictional’ organ, the African 
Commission,28 and an international jurisdictional organ, the African Court.  
The second part of the African Charter directly deals with the African Com-
mission, which took office in 1987 and consists of eleven members, who shall act 
in their personal capacity. The African Commission examines the periodical re-
ports submitted by the States Parties to the African Charter about the domestic 
implementation of human rights. It also receives communications from States, 
individuals and NGOs denouncing any alleged violation of the African Charter.  
The African Court has been created with the Protocol adopted in Ouagadou-
gou in 1998 and come into force in 2004.29 It is composed of eleven judges, exer-
cises a human rights action which is complementary to that of the African Com-
mission, and may adopt judgments and binding decisions. A new Protocol, 
adopted in Sharm el-Sheik in 2008, shall merge the African Court with the AU 
Court of Justice.30 
3.1. The African Commission 
The ultimate aim of every human rights system is the enjoyment of human rights by 
human beings. In order to correctly and properly achieve such ultimate aim, the 
28 On the qualification of the African Commission as a ‘quasi-jurisdictional’ organ, see G.J. 
NALDI, “The African Union and the Regional Human Rights System”, in The African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights: The System in Practice, 1986-2006, M. EVANS, R. MURRAY (eds), Cam-
bridge/New York, 2008, p. 20 ff., p. 35; M. KAMARA, “La promotion et la protection des droits 
fondamentaux dans le cadre de la Charte africaine des droits de l’homme et des peoples et du Pro-
tocole facultative additionnel de juin 1998”, in Revue trimestrielle des droits de l’homme 2005, p. 
709 ff., p. 713; L. PINESCHI, “Diritti umani (protezione internazionale dei)”, in Enciclopedia del 
diritto – Annali 2012, vol. V, Milano, p. 558 ff., p. 593. 
29 The Protocol has been currently ratified by thirty AU Member States and signed by fifty-two 
out of fifty-five (Cape Verde, Eritrea and Morocco have never signed). 
30 The aim of the Sharm el-Sheikh Protocol would be to create a unique African Court of Jus-
tice and Human Rights made up of two Sections: the first one competent for AU general affairs and 
the second one in charge of human rights issues. Another Amendment Protocol, adopted in Mala-
bo in 2014, shall further extend the competence of the merged African Court inasmuch as it adds a 
third Section mandated to deal with international criminal law. At present, the Sharm el-Sheikh 
Protocol has received only six ratifications (Benin, Burkina Faso, Congo-Brazzaville, Liberia, Libya 
and Mali), a number which is far from the fifteen requested for its entry into force. So, it is very un-
likely that the Sharm el-Sheikh Protocol and the Malabo Amendment Protocol will enter into force 
soon. For more information, see G. PASCALE, La tutela internazionale, cit., chapter 4. 
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States should be ready to correctly and properly enforce each act delivered by the 
monitoring bodies created thereto. That is not the case of the African States with 
respect to the acts of the African Commission. It is not by chance that the African 
Commission is described as «a toothless bulldog that barks but cannot bite».31  
This metaphor is appropriate above all as concerns the outcomes of the 
communications that individuals and NGOs bring before the African Commis-
sion.32 Indeed, if the African Commission finds a human rights violation, it can 
only issue a non-binding report addressing recommendations to the responsible 
State. Furthermore, the reports of the African Commission are confidential, since 
their publication is to be authorised by the AU Conference, namely by all the Af-
rican States including the State allegedly responsible.33 In addition, a weak mech-
anism supervises the domestic implementation of such reports.34 Similar prob-
lems affect the orders for provisional measures delivered by the African Commis-
sion.35 As a consequence, the African States maintain a certain freedom with re-
gard to the enforcement of the acts of the African Commission relating to indi-
vidual communications. In general terms, the more intrusive these acts are, the 
less willing to implement them the affected States are.36  
31 See N.J. UDOMBANA, “Towards the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights: Better 
Late Than Never”, in Yale Human Rights & Development Law Journal 2000, p. 45 ff., p. 64. 
32 Contrary to the European Court on Human Rights, the African Commission requires no co-
incidence between the author of the communication and the victim of the alleged violation. That 
encourages NGOs to file communications. See C.A. ODINKALU, C. CHRISTENSEN, “The African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights: The Development of Its Non-State Communication 
Procedures”, in Human Rights Quarterly 1998, p. 235 ff., and I. ÖSTERDAHL, Implementing Human 
Rights in Africa. The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights and Individual Communi-
cations, Uppsala, 2002, pp. 95 ff. 
33 About the reports following the individual communications, see I. ÖSTERDAHL, Implement-
ing Human Rights, cit., p. 131 ff.; G. BEKKER, “The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights and Remedies for Human Rights Violations”, in Human Rights Law Review 2013, p. 499 ff.; 
R. MURRAY, “Decisions by the African Commission on Individual Communications under the Afri-
can Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights”, in International & Comparative Law Quarterly 2007,
p. 412 ff.; F. VILJOEN, L. LOUW, “The Status of the Findings of the African Commission: From
Moral Persuasion to Legal Obligation”, in Journal of African Law 2004, p. 1 ff.
34 According to Art. 112 of its procedural rules, the African Commission may invite the con-
cerned State to submit information on the measures taken in response to a recommendation. If the 
African Commission ascertains that its recommendation has not been eventually implemented, it 
shall draw the attention of the AU Sub-Committee on the Implementation of AU decisions. How-
ever, the Sub-Committee has never been instituted.  
35 With regard to the orders for provisional measures of the African Commission, see G.J. 
NALDI, “Interim Measures of Protection in the African System for the Protection of Human and 
Peoples’ Rights”, in African Human Rights Law Journal 2002, 1 ff.; J.F. FLAUSS, “Notule sur les 
mesures provisoires devant la Commission africaine des droits de l’homme et des peoples”, in Re-
vue trimestrielle des droits de l’homme 2003, p. 923 ff.; A. SACCUCCI, Le misure provvisorie nella 
protezione internazionale dei diritti umani, Torino, 2006, pp. 64-72. 
36 On the problems arising from the domestic implementation of the recommendations of the 
African Commission, see R. MURRAY, D. LONG, The Implementation of the Findings of the African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Cambridge, 2015. Also see G.M. WACHIRA, A. AYINLA, 
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The African Commission can also receive interstate communications.37 As a 
matter of principle, each State Party to the African Charter should have a general 
interest to bring a communication against another State Party that has allegedly 
committed human rights violations. However, the African States do not usually 
care about that.38 Only four interstate communications have been introduced as 
of yet, and only one has been eventually examined by the African Commission. 
Moreover, in that case the claimant did not bring the communication because of 
the general interest to protect human rights, but in order to defend its territorial 
sovereignty and its nationals, namely its own interests.39 
Two further elements make the weakness of the African Commission even 
more evident. Firstly, many African States do not duly comply with Art. 62 of the 
African Charter, which provides that every two years they must transmit to the Af-
rican Commission a report concerning the domestic implementation of the African 
Charter. In particular, the reports often contain unhelpful information, are rarely 
biannual and do not usually abide by the procedural rules.40 Secondly, the African 
States do not approve the practice of the African Commission to deliver country-
specific resolutions on its own initiative. They have often objected through official 
statements of the AU Conference, although the country-specific resolutions were 
addressed to States where gross human rights violations had taken place.41 
“Twenty Years of Elusive Enforcement of the Recommendations of the African Commission on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights: A Possible Remedy”, in African Human Rights Law Journal 2006, p. 
465 ff., and F. VILJOEN, L. LOUW, “State Compliance with the Recommendations of the African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 1994-2004”, in American Journal of International Law 
2007, p. 1 ff. Then, see the documents From Judgment to Justice. Implementing International and 
Regional Human Rights Decisions and From Rights to Remedies. Structures and Strategies for Imple-
menting International Human Rights Decisions, published respectively in 2010 and in 2013 by Open 
Society Justice Initiative at www.opensocietyfoundations.org. 
37 According to Arts. 47-49 of the African Charter, each State Party may denounce another 
State Party for alleged human rights violations and thus institute a communication-negotiation 
(which entails direct diplomatic contacts between the two States, without any interference from the 
African Commission) or a communication-complaint (which envisages proceedings before the Afri-
can Commission). A communication-negotiation has never been submitted as of yet.   
38 Even in the other main human rights systems, the States Parties rarely bring interstate claims: 
see P. DE SENA, “Diritti dell’uomo”, Dizionario di diritto pubblico, in S. CASSESE (a cura di), Milano, 
2006, vol. III, p. 1868 ff., pp. 1876-1877. 
39 See Democratic Republic of The Congo v. Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda, Communication no. 
227/99, Report of 29 May 2003.  
40 See G.W. MUGWANYA, “Examination of State Reports by the African Commission: A Criti-
cal Appraisal”, in African Human Rights Law Journal 2001, p. 268 ff., and T.S. BULTO, “Beyond the 
Promises: Resuscitating the State Reporting Procedure under the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights”, in Buffalo Human Rights Law Review 2006, p. 57 ff. For a more recent and more 
optimistic view, see L. PINESCHI, Diritti umani, cit., p. 593. 
41 The AU Conference objected against a country-specific resolution for the first time during its 
session held in January 2006. It did not approve the resolutions of the African Commission con-
demning the human rights violations perpetrated in Eritrea, Ethiopia, The Sudan, Uganda and Zim-
babwe. The AU Conference stated that the African Commission should have informed the men-
tioned States before delivering the resolutions. See decision no. 101, of 24 January 2006, para. 1. 
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It is now clear that the scarce effectiveness of the action of the African Com-
mission depends on the African States. Even though the African Commission has 
recently tried to go beyond such limits,42 it is a matter of fact that the African 
States do not encourage its action and rarely implement its acts. Should any re-
newal of the African Commission be supported by the African States, it would be 
successful. Otherwise, any attempt to duly protect human rights would not go 
beyond the borders of the African Commission itself.  
3.2. The African Court 
As an international jurisdictional organ enabled to issue judgments and binding 
decisions, the African Court should reinforce the continental human rights moni-
toring mechanism. In particular, it should complement the African Commission. 
However, between the concrete outcomes of the African Commission and those 
of the African Court there are actually few differences. In a nutshell, the ‘jurisdic-
tionalisation’ of the continental monitoring mechanism has not improved the 
protection of human rights in Africa. In order to give evidence of that, suffice it 
to refer to the ratione personae competence of the African Court and to the do-
mestic implementation of its binding acts.  
Art. 5 of the Ouagadougou Protocol governs the ratione personae competence 
of the African Court. The ‘filter’ claimants (African Commission and States Par-
ties to the Protocol) can turn to the African Court just for cases pertaining to 
communications already brought before the African Commission. As of yet, only 
the African Commission itself has deferred three cases to the African Court.43 
The ‘direct’ claimants (African intergovernmental organisations and States Par-
ties to the Protocol whose nationals have suffered human rights violations perpe-
trated by other States parties) can act without any limit before the African 
Court.44 However, they have never brought a claim so far. The States Parties to 
42 For instance, the African Commission is trying to eliminate the politicisation often featuring 
its bench. Then, in 2010, it reformed its procedural rules in order to reduce its dependence on the 
AU Conference. Moreover, even if Art. 58 of the African Charter provides that the African Com-
mission could admit only communications pertaining to serious and massive human rights viola-
tions, it examines even cases of isolated violations (for this approach, see Sir Dawda K. Jawara v. 
The Gambia, Communications no. 147/95 and 149/96, Report of 11 May 2000, paras. 41-42).  
43 The African Commission deferred to the African Court the case concerning the human 
rights violations perpetrated in Libya in 2011. The claim was eventually removed from the register 
due to the evolution of the situation in Libya (African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights v. 
Socialist Peoples’ Libyan Arab Great Jamahirya, application no. 004/11, decision of 25 March 2013). 
Then, the African Commission sent to the African Court the cases pertaining to the eviction of the 
Ogiek indigenous peoples from the Mau Forest in Kenya (African Commission on Human and Peo-
ples’ Rights v. Kenya, application no. 006/12, judgment of 26 May 2017) and to Saif al-Islam Kha-
dafy, arrested and sentenced to death by an insurrectional Libyan tribunal (African Commission on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights v. Libya, application no. 002/13, judgment of 3 June 2016).  
44 The Protocol underlines the difference between the interest of a State Party acting for the 
general purpose of protecting human rights and the interest of a State Party whose citizens are vic-
tims of the violations perpetrated by another State Party. Only the latter can directly bring a claim 
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the Protocol accept to appear before the African Court whenever involved in an 
application introduced by both the ‘direct’ and the ‘filter’ claimants.  
Individuals and NGOs are ‘non-direct’ claimants. The African Court can ex-
amine their claims provided that the involved State has given its authorisation by 
means of a prior official declaration.45 Only eight States currently accept the 
competence of the African Court for such claims.46 Combined with the social and 
economic limits which are intrinsic to the African environment, such situation 
considerably restricts the workload of the Court. Otherwise, individuals and 
NGOs would have clearly been the most active claimants before the Court. In 
the end, that seemingly entails that the African States are ready to institute juris-
dictional monitoring bodies as long as their interests are not seriously threatened. 
With regard to the domestic implementation of the binding acts of the Afri-
can Court, little information is available. It is true that, so far, the African Court 
has passed a limited number of judgments as well as of decisions on reparations 
and orders for provisional measures.47 In any case, had the African States en-
forced the acts of the African Court, their interest would have been to communi-
cate that. So, since the African States have not given updates about the follow-up 
of such acts, it is likely that they have not implemented them as of yet.48  
Furthermore, according to Art. 29, para. 2, of the Ouagadougou Protocol, 
the AU Executive Council is in charge of monitoring the domestic implementa-
tion of the acts of the African Court. Since the Executive Council is composed of 
before the African Court. So, the Protocol acknowledges both the tendency of States not to intro-
duce interstate claims before international organs and the exception concerning the situations when 
a direct interest is at stake. For insightful and more extensive comments on such topic, see M.I. 
PAPA, “Protezione diplomatica, diritti umani e obblighi erga omnes”, in Rivista di diritto interna-
zionale 2008, p. 669 ff., mainly p. 697 ff.  
45 Art. 5, para. 3, of the Protocol provides that the African Court may entitle individuals and 
NGOs to institute cases directly before it only in accordance with the subsequent Art. 34, para. 6. 
Such provision specifies that, at the time of the ratification of the Protocol or any time thereafter, the 
States Parties shall make a declaration accepting the competence of the Court to receive cases under 
Art. 5, para. 3. Otherwise, the Court will not receive any claim coming from individuals or NGOs. 
46 Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Malawi, Mali, Tanzania and Tunisia. Rwanda 
has recently withdrawn its previous declaration as a protest against the African Court, that is deal-
ing with a case concerning the violations allegedly suffered by the main political opponent to the 
Rwandese President. See the press release of the Rwandese Ministry of Justice concerning the with-
drawal unilateral act of Rwanda, which was transmitted to the President of the African Court on 3 
March 2016, available at www.minijust.gov.rw. 
47 To have a complete panorama of all the acts adopted by the African Court so far, see its offi-
cial website, www.african-court.org. 
48 By way of illustration, Tanzania has never given official information about the implementa-
tion of the first judgment passed by the African Court (Tanganyika Law Society, The Legal and 
Human Rights Centre and Reverend Christopher R. Mtikila v. Tanzania, applications no. 009/11 and 
011/11, judgment of 14 June 2013). However, in the context of the following procedure concerning 
the reparations sought by one victim, Tanzania revealed that its laws conflicting with the African 
Charter have not been nor will be modified (Reverend Christopher R. Mtikila v. Tanzania, applica-
tion no. 011/11, decision of 13 June 2014, para. 23). 
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States representatives who decide by consensus,49 it is unlikely that it would adopt 
sanctions against the States (whose representatives also participate in its meet-
ings) that did not enforce the acts of the African Court. 
As it is, contrary to the expectations manifested in the preamble to the Oua-
gadougou Protocol and in some AU acts,50 the institution of the African Court has 
proved not to be the best solution to the problems affecting the continental hu-
man rights monitoring mechanism. What is more, it is also doubtful that the Afri-
can States actually pursued the just mentioned goal while creating the Court.51 
3.3. Complementarity Between the African Commission and the African Court 
The African Court and the African Commission pursue similar aims for the most 
part. Therefore, they must act coherently with each other and avoid any incon-
sistency that could threaten the protection of human rights in Africa. For this 
purpose, according to Art. 2 of the Ouagadougou Protocol and to the procedural 
rules of both the African Commission and the African Court, complementarity 
shall govern the relationship between the two organs.52 
Art. 2 of the Ouagadougou Protocol precisely states that «[t]he Court shall, 
bearing in mind the provisions of this Protocol, complement the protective man-
date of the African Commission […] conferred upon it by the African Charter». 
Hence, complementarity should operate from the former towards the latter. After 
all, as just observed, the African Court was officially established in order to rein-
force the human rights mandate of the African Commission. Then, Art. 5, para. 
1, of the Ouagadougou Protocol declares that the ‘direct’ claimants can turn to 
the African Court only if pertinent proceedings have already been instituted be-
fore the African Commission. Similarly, Art. 5, para. 3, of the Ouagadougou Pro-
tocol admits only NGOs with an advisory status before the African Commission 
to bring a claim before the African Court. 
49 See Arts. 10-13 of the AU Constitutive Act, dedicated to the AU Executive Council. 
50 See the last Paragraph of the preamble to the Ouagadougou Protocol. Also see OAU Assem-
bly, The Strengthening of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights and the Establish-
ment of an African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights, Resolution no. 230 of 15 June 1994, para. 4, 
and OAU Executive Council, Measures Taken to Implement Resolution AHG/RES. 230 (XXX) Re-
lating to the Strengthening of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights and the Estab-
lishment of an African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights, Resolution no. 1674 of 5 July 1996, para. 
4. The OAU organs adopted many similar acts in the years 1994-1998.
51 For in-depth analysis on this point, see G. PASCALE, La tutela internazionale, cit., p. 215 ff.,
305 ff. For similar doubts, see M. MUBIALA, op. cit., p. 93. 
52 For a general overview of the relationship between the African Commission and the African 
Court, see I.A. BADAWI EL-SHEIKH, “The Future Relationship between the African Court and the 
African Commission”, in African Human Rights Law Journal 2002, p. 252 ff.; S.T. EBOBRAH, “To-
wards a Positive Application of Complementarity in the African Human Rights System: Issues of 
Functions and Relations”, in European Journal of International Law 2011, p. 663 ff.; M. MALILA, 
“Promising Siblings: The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights and the African Court 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights”, in East African Journal of Peace and Human Rights 2011, p. 551 ff. 
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Nevertheless, some other provisions included in the Ouagadougou Protocol 
and in the procedural rules of both the African Commission and the African 
Court indicate that the complementarity between the two organs also works in a 
reverse sense. In other words, sometimes the action of the African Commission 
can complement that of the African Court. Art. 6, para. 3, of the Ouagadougou 
Protocol gives the main example. It provides that the African Court may transfer 
a case to the African Commission at its own discretion.53 Moreover, the proce-
dural rules of both organs have recently been harmonised in order to promote a 
sort of mutual complementarity.54 
Hence, the relationship between the African Commission and African Court 
can be better described as based on reciprocity. The African Commission and the 
African Court are autonomous but interdependent organs belonging to the same 
human rights system.55 It means that the African Court is not subordinated to the 
African Commission. It also entails that the former cannot be qualified as an ap-
pellate organ, available for the claimants who are unsatisfied with the reports is-
sued by the latter.56 
4. The African Sub-Regional Jurisdictional Organs and the Extension of their
Competence to Human Rights Disputes
The bodies protecting human rights in Africa at a sub-regional level are placed 
under the general frame of the African Economic Community (AEC), an inter-
governmental organisation instituted in 1991 through the Abuja Treaty.57 The 
53 Art. 6, para. 3, of the Ouagadougou Protocol was applied for the first time when the African 
Court transferred to the African Commission an individual claim that the former could not exam-
ine because it had been brought against a State not accepting the competence of the African Court 
for individual claims. See Soufiane Ababou v. Algeria, application no 002/11, decision of 16 June 
2011. In the following period, the African Court continued to transfer to the African Commission 
similar individual claims, even though the reason was not explicitly specified. In the last years, how-
ever, such practice did not find fertile terrain any longer.  
54 According to Arts. 8 and 33 of the Ouagadougou Protocol, the African Court shall cooper-
ate with the African Commission in the definition of its procedural rules. Therefore, the two organs 
elaborated their new procedural rules, applied since 2010, in the context of a series of joint meet-
ings. Art. 29 of the procedural rules of the African Court is dedicated to the complementarity with 
the African Commission, while the fourth part of the procedural rules of the African Commission 
concerns the complementarity with the African Court.   
55 For such qualification, see I. ÖSTERDAHL, “The Jurisdiction Ratione Materiae of the African 
Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights: A Comparative Critique”, in Review of the African Commis-
sion on Human and Peoples’ Rights 1998, p. 132 ff., p. 133. 
56 For different opinions on the qualification of the African Court as an appellate organ of the 
African Commission, see I.A. BADAWI EL-SHEIKH, op. cit., p. 254, and A. DEL VECCHIO, I Tribunali 
internazionali tra globalizzazione e localismi, Bari, 2009, p. 146. 
57 Only Djibouti, Eritrea, Madagascar, Morocco, Somalia and South Sudan are not AEC Mem-
bers. About the AEC, see J. SENGHOR, “The Treaty Establishing the African Economic Communi-
ty: An Introductory Essay”, in African Yearbook of International Law 1993, vol. I, p. 183 ff.; K.D. 
MAGLIVERAS, G.J. NALDI, “The African Economic Community: Emancipation for African States or 
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AEC should evolve according to a two-step process: firstly, the establishment of 
the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) as areas of economic and commer-
cial integration at a sub-regional level; secondly, the creation of an economic, 
commercial and monetary union at a continental level. The first phase is now on-
going, and many RECs have already been established. In particular, eight of them 
are now considered as the AEC ‘pillars’.58 
Some of the treaties instituting the RECs also create sub-regional jurisdiction-
al organs, while others require the States Parties to stipulate specific protocols to 
this effect.59 Initially, the sub-regional jurisdictional organs could not examine 
human rights disputes, since the ratione materiae competence attributed to them 
exclusively concerned the interpretation and application of their respective RECs 
treaties. However, these treaties contain some references to the African Charter 
and to human rights. In addition, all sub-regional jurisdictional organs can (or 
could) receive individual claims. All that soon gave them the opportunity to au-
tonomously extend their material competence to the field of human rights.60 
The sub-regional jurisdictional organs began to deal with human rights affairs 
when the African States declared they would negotiate the African Court Proto-
col. Then, while the entry into force of the Protocol was facing obstacles, the sub-
regional jurisdictional organs strengthened their human rights competence, main-
ly because of their effortless and simple rules and their geographical proximity to 
the individual applicants. They maintained such human rights competence even 
immediately after the establishment of the African Court, in consideration of the 
abovementioned limits of the African Court.61 
Yet Another Glorious Failure?”, in North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial 
Regulation 1999, p. 601 ff.; M.M MBENGE, O. ILLY, “The African Economic Community”, in The 
African Union: Legal and Institutional Framework, cit., p. 187 ff. 
58 The eight ‘pillars’ are connected to the AEC through a Protocol signed in 1998, available in Af-
rican Journal of International and Comparative Law 1998, p. 157 ff. On this topic, see R. FRIMPONG-
OPPONG, “The African Union, the African Economic Community and Africa’s Regional Economic 
Communities: Untangling a Complex Web”, in African Journal of International and Comparative Law 
2010, p. 92 ff. Many RECs currently deal not only with economic and commercial affairs, but also 
with military and political cooperation. Moreover, the RECs Members very often overlap, creating a 
confusing scenario: see M. SHERIFF IDDRISU, The ‘Spaghetti-Bowl’ of Africa’s Economic Integration. A 
Critique of the African Union’s Rationalisation Process, Saarbrücken, 2012, and P. PENNETTA, “Brevi 
note su alcune nuove espressioni del regionalismo africano”, in La Comunità internazionale 2015, p. 
577 ff. 
59 For a general overview of the RECs jurisdictional organs, see the essays collected in
L’evoluzione dei sistemi giurisdizionali regionali e influenze comunitarie, P. PENNETTA (a cura di),
Bari, 2010. 
60 After all, the well-known example of the EU had already clarified the tie between the pro-
cesses of regional economic integration and the jurisdictional protection of human rights. Neverthe-
less, it will be seen in the following pages that, while the EU jurisdictional organs can exclusively 
examine the alleged human rights violations related to EU law, the African sub-regional tribunals 
developed their human rights competence beyond the legal frame underlying the RECs.  
61 For an overview of the phases concerning the development of the human rights competence 
of the African sub-regional jurisdictional organs, see L.N. MURUNGI, J. GALLINETTI, “The Role of 
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The African States reacted in different ways to the increasing human rights 
activism of the sub-regional jurisdictional organs: nowadays, while some of these 
organs continue to have competence for human rights disputes, others have ex-
perienced a dissimilar fate. In the following pages three examples will shed light 
on the current outcomes of the activism of the African sub-regional jurisdictional 
organs in the field of human rights.62 
4.1 The SADC Tribunal 
The SADC Tribunal extended its competence to human rights disputes due to a 
broad interpretation of the preamble and some provisions of the SADC Treaty.63 
On this basis, in the years before 2010, the SADC Tribunal confronted Zimbabwe 
about the human rights violations suffered by the white minorities living in the 
Country. In particular, the family-owned Campbell company denounced Zimba-
bwe before the SADC Tribunal because of the Land Acquisition Amendment Act, 
passed in order to dispossess the white farmers of their properties, and other al-
leged human rights violations. The situation culminated when the SADC Tribunal 
confirmed the responsibility of Zimbabwe in its subsequent judgment.64  
Sub-Regional Courts in the African Human Rights System”, in International Journal of Human 
Rights 2010, p. 119 ff. According to some scholars, that is a symbol of the growing human rights 
awareness of the African States: see S.T. EBOBRAH, “Litigating Human Rights before Sub-Regional 
Courts in Africa. Prospects and Challenges”, in African Journal of International and Comparative 
Law 2009, p. 79 ff., and L. POLI, “La Corte di giustizia dell’ECOWAS: quali prospettive per un 
concreto miglioramento della tutela dei diritti umani in Africa?”, in Diritti umani e diritto interna-
zionale 2014, p. 133 ff. For a different opinion, see L. NATHAN, “The Disbanding of the SADC 
Tribunal: A Cautionary Tale”, in Human Rights Quarterly 2013, p. 870 ff., and S. SMIS, “The Pro-
tection of Human Rights Through the Courts of Regional Economic Communities in Africa”, in 
Liberae Cogitationes. Liber Amicorum Marc Bossuyt, A. ALEN, V. JOOSTEN, R. LEYSEN, W. VERRIJDT 
(eds), Cambridge, 2013, p. 617 ff., mainly pp. 634-635, both underlining that the African States do 
not often support the human rights activism of the sub-regional jurisdictional organs. 
62 The three African sub-regional jurisdictional organs whose judicial histories are briefly ex-
amined here are also chosen as paradigmatic examples by K.J. ALTER, J.T. GATHII, L.R. HELFER, 
“Backlash against International Courts in West, East and Southern Africa: Causes and Conse-
quences”, in European Journal of International Law 2016, p. 293 ff. Such essay was commented by 
K.O. KUFUOR, C.J. TAMS, E. DE WET, in EJIL Talk!, August 2016, available at www.ejiltalk.org. 
63 The SADC Treaty was stipulated in 1992 and amended many times afterwards. Art. 16 of 
this Treaty requires the States Parties to create a Tribunal. The Protocol instituting the SADC Tri-
bunal was stipulated in 2000 and entered into force in 2001. Then, it has been amended several 
times. The SADC Tribunal extended its competence to human rights disputes on the basis of Art. 
4(c), of the SADC Treaty, providing that «SADC and its Member States shall act in accordance 
with […] human rights, democracy and the rule of law», and Art. 6, para. 2, stating that «SADC 
and its Member States shall not discriminate against any person on grounds of gender, religion, po-
litical views, race, ethnic origin, culture or disability». All the SADC documents mentioned hereaf-
ter are available at the SADC official website, www.sadc.int. 
64 See Mike Campbell (PVT) Ltd and Others v. Zimbabwe, application of 11 October 2007, 
judgment of 28 November 2008. For comments, see A. DI LIETO, “La discriminazione razziale con-
tro i bianchi in Zimbabwe nella giurisprudenza del Tribunale della Comunità dello sviluppo 
dell’Africa australe”, in Diritti umani e diritto internazionale 2009, p. 432 ff.; A. MOYO, “Defending 
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The Zimbabwean Government soon affirmed to feel bound neither to that 
specific judgment nor to any other decision concerning human rights matters, 
given that a human rights mandate had never been conferred upon the SADC 
Tribunal. Furthermore, some prominent Zimbabwean politicians indirectly 
threatened the judges of the SADC Tribunal. Basically, Zimbabwe did not ap-
preciate the human rights activism of the SADC Tribunal.65 In 2010, it eventually 
persuaded the SADC Summit (the executive organ made up of all Member 
States) to suspend the activities of the SADC Tribunal.66  
Later, on 21 August 2014, the SADC Summit adopted a new Protocol insti-
tuting a new SADC Tribunal.67 Since the new SADC Tribunal can examine only 
interstate claims, it will unlikely deal with human rights disputes again. As a re-
Human Rights and the Rule of Law by the SADC Tribunal: Campbell and Beyond”, in African 
Human Rights Law Journal 2009, p. 601 ff.; W. SCHOLTZ, G. FERREIRA, “Much Ado about Noth-
ing? The SADC Tribunal’s Quest for the Rule of Law Pursuant to Regional Integration”, in 
Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht 2011, p. 331 ff. 
65 In two interviews given in December 2008 to the newspapers The Zimbabwean and The 
Zimbabwe Times, Mugabe defined the judgment issued in the Campbell case as «an exercise in futil-
ity», while the Ministry for Lands qualified the judges of the SADC Tribunal as «day-dreaming». In 
another interview given to the newspaper The Namibian on 28 February 2009, Mugabe underlined 
that «[t]here is no going back on the land reforms» and that «[s]ome farmers went to the SADC 
Tribunal in Namibia but that’s nonsense, absolute nonsense, no one will follow that [...]. We have 
courts here in this country that can determine the rights of people. Our land issues are not subject 
to the SADC Tribunal». Then, on 2 September 2009, the Ministry of Justice published the note 
Legal Opinion on Zimbabwe and the Jurisdiction of the SADC Tribunal (available at www.sadc.int 
and also published on The Zimbabwean and The Zimbabwe Times), where he argued that «any de-
cision that the SADC Tribunal may have or may make in future against the Republic of Zimbabwe 
is null and void». For more details about the reaction of Zimbabwe to the human rights activism of 
the SADC Tribunal, see O.C. RUPPEL, “The Southern African Development Community and Its 
Tribunal: Reflections on a Regional Economic Communities’ Potential Impact on Human Rights 
Protection”, in Verfassung und Recht in Übersee 2009, p. 173 ff., p. 183; L. NATHAN, op. cit., p. 876; 
J.T. GATHII, “The Under-Appreciated Jurisprudence of Africa’s Regional Trade Judiciaries”, in 
Oregon Review of International Law 2010, p. 245 ff., mainly pp. 275-278. 
66 The suspension of the SADC Tribunal was deliberated by the Thirtieth SADC Summit on 17 
August 2010 (see above all para. 32 of the final communiqué) and confirmed by the extraordinary 
SADC Summit held on 20 May 2011. In its diplomatic pressure concerning the suspension of the 
SADC Tribunal, Zimbabwe was strongly supported by Tanzania, whose President, referring to the 
SADC Tribunal, seemingly declared that «we have created a monster that will devour us all»: see A. 
FØLLESDAL, J.K. SCHAFFER, G. ULFSTEIN, “International Human Rights and the Challenge for Le-
gitimacy”, in The Legitimacy of International Human Rights Regimes, A. FØLLESDAL, J.K.
SCHAFFER, G. ULFSTEIN (eds), Cambridge, 2015, p. 1 ff., p. 9. 
67 The decision to stipulate a new Protocol instituting a new SADC Tribunal was adopted dur-
ing the Thirty-Second SADC Summit, on 18 August 2012 (see para. 24 of the final communiqué). 
Then, the new Protocol was approved on 21 August 2014, during the Thirty-Fourth SADC Sum-
mit. The new SADC Tribunal will take office after two thirds of the SADC Member States ratify 
the new Protocol according to its Art. 35. So far, only Zimbabwe has ratified the new Protocol.  
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sult, quoting two scholars, the SADC Member States ‘emasculated’ the SADC 
Tribunal, eradicating the human rights competence it had developed.68  
4.2. The EAC Court of Justice 
As observed, the development of the human rights competence of the African 
sub-regional jurisdictional organs started as a matter of judicial initiative. Then, 
in some cases, the African States intervened, eliminating or confirming such 
competence by means of treaty provisions. Instead, in other cases, these organs 
still now examine human rights disputes exclusively on the basis of their judicial 
discretion, thus without a precise treaty competence. The example of the EAC 
Court of Justice is the most prominent.69 
Indeed, the AEC Treaty itself requires the Member States to conclude a pro-
tocol that officially attributes a human rights mandate to the EAC Court of Jus-
tice.70 The AEC Member States had begun to negotiate such protocol immediate-
ly after the entry into force of the AEC Treaty. However, the talks encountered 
an obstacle in 2007, when the EAC Court of Justice issued its judgment in the 
Anyang Nyong’o affair, declaring that Kenya had violated some political rights 
enshrined in the African Charter.71 As well as the SADC Tribunal, the EAC 
Court of Justice delivered that judgment without an express human rights com-
68 See K.D. MAGLIVERAS, G.J. NALDI, “The New SADC Tribunal or the Emasculation of an 
International Tribunal”, in Netherlands International Law Review 2016, p. 133 ff. For the 
(non)intervention of the African Commission in the process of ‘emasculation’ of the SADC Tribu-
nal, see H.J. SARKIN, “A Critique of the Decision of the African Commission on Human and Peo-
ples’ Rights Permitting the Demolition of the SADC Tribunal: Politics Versus Economics and Hu-
man Rights”, in African Journal of International and Comparative Law 2016, p. 215 ff. With regard 
to the evolution of the SADC Tribunal in light of the Campbell case and for some general implica-
tions affecting international law, see G. PASCALE, “Sulla posizione dell’individuo nel diritto interna-
zionale: il caso Campbell e le vicende successive nell’Africa australe”, in Rivista di diritto internazio-
nale 2015, p. 852 ff. For a critical assessment of the new SADC Tribunal, see E. TINO, “Il diniego di 
accesso alla giustizia per i soggetti privati nella SADC: alcune considerazioni sul nuovo Protocollo 
sul Tribunale”, in Diritti umani e diritto internazionale 2017, p. 477 ff. 
69 The EAC Treaty (signed in 1999) directly created the EAC Court of Justice after it came into 
force in 2000. The EAC Treaty has been amended twice, in 2006 and in 2007. Now, Chapter Eighth 
(Artt. 23-47) of the EAC Treaty is entirely dedicated to the EAC Court of Justice. All the documents 
concerning EAC are available at the EAC official website, www.eac.int. For details about the EAC 
Court of Justice, see P. VAN DER MEI, “Regional Integration: The Contribution of the Court of Justice 
of the East African Community”, in Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht 
2009, p. 403 ff.; J.T. GATHII, “Mission Creep or a Search for Relevance: The East African Court of 
Justice’s Human Rights Strategy”, in Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law 2013, p. 249 
ff.; T.P. MILEJ, “Human Rights Protection by International Courts – What Role for the East African 
Court of Justice?”, in African Journal of International and Comparative Law 2018, p. 108 ff. 
70 See Art. 27, para. 2, of the EAC Treaty. 
71 See Anyang’ Nyong’o and Others v. Kenya, application of 8 November 2006, judgment of 29 
March 2007. In this case, the applicant successfully challenged the Kenyan Government’s mode of 
selecting delegates to the EAC Legislative Assembly.  
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petence.72 Along these lines, Kenya protested and caused the interruption of the 
drafting process of the protocol for a long period. The negotiations have been re-
cently revitalized, but they are progressing with no haste.73  
Waiting for the EAC Member States to adopt the protocol, the EAC Court of 
Justice has always continued to deal with human rights disputes. By way of illus-
tration, in the judgment issued in the Katabazi affair immediately after the ‘Ken-
yan impasse’, on the one hand, it admitted not to have any explicit competence 
for human rights disputes while, on the other, it added not to consider itself ex-
empt from settling disputes ‘also related’ to human rights.74 The EAC Court of 
Justice did not give more details about such reasoning in the other decisions (al-
so) concerning human rights questions. However, as a matter of fact, in those de-
cisions it ascertained the responsibility of the defendant States for some human 
rights violations.75   
4.3. The ECOWAS Court of Justice 
The ECOWAS Court of Justice initially extended its competence to the field of 
human rights on the grounds of the adherence of ECOWAS to the promotion and 
protection of human rights and of the cooperation required of ECOWAS Mem-
ber States to realise the objectives of the African Charter (see respectively Art. 
4(g), and Art. 56, par. 2, of the ECOWAS Treaty). The ECOWAS Member States 
did not object and, what is more, in 2005 they attached a Supplementary Protocol 
to the ECOWAS Treaty, whose Art. 9, para. 4, and Art. 10(d), now explicitly con-
firm such competence.76 Nowadays, the ECOWAS Court of Justice exercises a 
72 After all, it does not seem that the preamble and Art. 6(d), of the EAC Treaty («the funda-
mental principles that shall govern the achievement of the objectives of the Community by the Part-
ner States shall include […] the recognition, promotion and protection of human and peoples’ rights 
in accordance with the provisions of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights») can be 
interpreted as conferring a clear human rights mandate upon the EAC Court of Justice. 
73 See J.T. GATHII, “Mission Creep”, cit., pp. 268-271, and K.J. ALTER, J.T. GATHII, L.R.
HELFER, op. cit., pp. 300-306. 
74 See Katabazi and Others v. Uganda, application of 29 August 2007, judgment of 1 November 
2007, section on admissibility. For comments, see L.N. MURUNGI, J. GALLINETTI, op. cit., pp. 132-
133, and J.T. GATHII, “Mission Creep”, cit., pp. 254-256. 
75 As examples, see Independent Medical Unit v. Kenya and Four Others, application of 2 July 
2010, judgment of 29 June 2011, and Plaxeda Rugumba v. Secretary General of the East African 
Community and Rwanda, application of 8 November 2010, judgment of 1 December 2011. 
76 The ECOWAS Treaty had been signed in 1975. Then, it was revised in 1993. The Protocol 
on the ECOWAS Court of Justice was stipulated in 1991 and later attached to the new ECOWAS 
Treaty. It entered into force in 1996. The Supplementary Protocol Amending the Protocol Relating 
to the ECOWAS Court of Justice was adopted in 2005, after the ECOWAS Court of Justice dealt 
with human rights in the case Afolabi Olajide v. Niger, application no. 01/03, judgment of 27 April 
2004. Since then, the ECOWAS Court of Justice has very often examined human rights disputes. A 
lot of studies about its human rights action have been produced. See, above all, S.T. EBOBRAH, A 
Critical Analysis of the Human Rights Mandate of the ECOWAS Community Court of Justice, Co-
penhagen, 2009; K.J. ALTER, L.R. HELFER, J.R. MCALLISTER, “A New International Human Rights 
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very broad human rights mandate: suffice it to say that the exhaustion of domestic 
remedies is not included among the admissibility conditions for individual 
claims.77  
Nevertheless, the ECOWAS Member States are currently examining a draft 
reform aimed at dismissing the human rights competence of the ECOWAS Court 
of Justice. The Gambia has suggested this reform in the context of a contrast 
with the ECOWAS Court of Justice about the domestic implementation of two 
judgments where the responsibility of The Gambia for human rights violations 
was declared.78 Even if such situation turns out to be very similar to those oc-
curred in both the SADC and the EAC frames, the outcome will predictably be 
different. In general terms, the majority of the ECOWAS Member States does 
not show an effective proclivity to approve the reform under examination.  
The overall impression is that the ECOWAS Governments are trying to in-
crease human rights awareness in Western Africa in order to depict themselves as 
human rights supporters. One can just consider that five out of eight African 
States accepting the competence of the African Court for individual and NGOs 
claims belong to ECOWAS (Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana and Ma-
li). Probably, the aim of the majority of the ECOWAS Member States is to feed 
the relations with the traditional international donors (EU, UN, Scandinavian 
States and some NGOs), who take care of human rights. As a matter of fact, Chi-
na and India (and other new donors who attribute less importance to human 
rights) do not usually send many development aids to the Western African Coun-
tries, since they prefer to invest in other African regions.79 Therefore, in the end, 
Court for West Africa: The ECOWAS Community Court of Justice”, in American Journal of Inter-
national Law 2013, p. 737 ff.; L. POLI, op. cit., p. 133 ff. For all the documents concerning 
ECOWAS that will be mentioned hereafter, see the ECOWAS website, www.ecowas.int. 
77 The ECOWAS Court of Justice clarified many times that the exhaustion of domestic remedies 
is not an admissibility condition. By way of illustration, see Essien v. The Gambia and Another, appli-
cation no. 05/05, judgment of 29 October 2007, and Koraou v. Niger, application no. 08/08, judg-
ment of 27 October 2008. With regard to such peculiarity, the ECOWAS Court of Justice is differ-
ent from the majority of the international organs dealing with human rights disputes. For comments 
on the point, see A.O. ENABULELE, “Sailing against the Tide: Exhaustion of Domestic Remedies and 
the ECOWAS Community Court of Justice”, in Journal of African Law 2012, p. 268 ff. 
78 See Manneh v. The Gambia, application no. 04/07, judgment of 5 June 2008, and Saidykhan 
v. The Gambia, application no. 11/07, judgment of 16 December 2010, both concerning tortures
suffered by journalists. For comments, see K.J. ALTER, L.R. HELFER, J.R. MCALLISTER, op. cit., pp.
761-765, and K.J. ALTER, J.T. GATHII, L.R. HELFER, op. cit., pp. 296-300.
79 The economies of the Western African States mostly depend on the donations coming from
the EU, the UN, the Scandinavian States and many NGOs. Such dependence has increased after 
the Ebola crisis broke out in the region in 2014. See D. PRINCE-AGBODJAN, “Accord de partenariat 
économique entre l’Union Européenne et l’Afrique de l’Ouest: droit international économique, 
droits humains indivisibles et économie politique”, in African Yearbook of International Law 2015, 
vol. XXII, p. 168 ff. On the contrary, in Southern Africa and in other African regions the ‘Western’ 
aids are currently considered less prominent, mainly because of the presence of China and India, 
which do not request a strong respect of human rights, democracy and the rule of law in change of 
their donations. See the essays collected in F. CHERU, C. OBI (eds), The Rise of China and India in 
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it is likely that the ECOWAS Member States will opt for avoiding any blatant 
conflict with the ECOWAS Court of Justice on the topic of human rights. 
5. Search for Coordination between the African Court and the African Sub-
Regional Jurisdictional Organs: The Lack of Relevant Provisions
In the African human rights context, overlapping situations may occur between 
sub-regional jurisdictional organs and continental monitoring bodies. In some 
way, such situations have their roots in the well-known proliferation of interna-
tional tribunals.80 As observed in the next pages, some scholars assert that it is 
necessary to find a way to govern such proliferation, that is to say to coordinate 
the several monitoring bodies existing in the current international legal system. In 
particular, there should be coordination if the same dispute already settled by an 
international organ is afterwards assigned to another one. Likewise, coordination 
should avoid that identical or related proceedings go on at the same time before 
two or more international bodies.81 Otherwise, some problems would arise, and 
the coherence of international law would be threatened.  
The human rights treaties instituting international monitoring bodies some-
times prevent potential overlapping situations, making reference to ‘coordination 
rules’ inspired by some principles – like lis pendens or res iudicata – usually ap-
plied with similar aims in domestic orders.82 It seems correct to underline that 
Africa: Challenges, Opportunities and Critical Interventions, London, 2010, and in M. BURNAY, J.C.
DEFRAIGNE, J. WOUTERS (eds), China, the European Union and the Developing World: Analysing 
and Comparing a Triangular Relationship Region by Region, Cheltenham, 2015, parts IV and VI. 
80 The proliferation of international tribunals has been already introduced above, note 5. 
81 It is well-known that two disputes are identical if their three constitutive elements (personae, 
petitum and causa petendi) are all identical, and that parallel proceedings arise when an identical 
dispute is assigned to two or more judges. Such situations are particularly problematic in private 
international law, namely when the judges dealing with the same dispute belong to different domes-
tic orders (see extensively F. MARONGIU BUONAIUTI, Litispendenza e connessione internazionale. 
Strumenti di coordinamento tra giurisdizioni statali in materia civile, Napoli, 2008). In public inter-
national law, it is unlikely that the three elements defining a dispute coincide, so it could very rarely 
happen that two organs examine the same dispute. Anyway, cases of related proceedings may occur 
in public international law: two disputes, although not strictly identical, may be very similar (for 
instance if two out of three constitutive elements correspond). For a dated but illuminating study 
on this topic, see G. TÉNÉKIDÈS, “L’exception de litispendance devant les organismes interna-
tionaux”, in Revue générale de droit international public 1929, p. 502 ff. Also see K. OELLERS-
FRAHM, “Multiplication of International Courts and Tribunals and Conflicting Jurisdictions – 
Problems and Possible Solutions”, in Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law, vol. V, 2001, p. 
67 ff., and A. REINISCH, “The Use and Limits of Res Iudicata and Lis Pendens as Procedural Tools 
to Avoid Conflicting Dispute Settlement Outcomes”, in The Law & Practice of International Courts 
and Tribunals 2004, p. 37 ff.  
82 With some differences, both Art. 35, para. 2, of the European Convention on Human Rights 
and Art. 47(d), of the American Convention on Human Rights state that their respective Courts shall 
not deal with any application that is substantially the same as a matter that has already been examined 
or submitted to another procedure of international investigation or settlement. Then, Art. 5, para. 2, 
of the Optional Protocol attached to the UN International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights de-
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such international ‘coordination rules’ only draw inspiration by the just men-
tioned domestic principles, whose proper existence in international law is not 
admissible, mainly because of the lack of hierarchy and systematic organisation 
among the increasing number of international jurisdictional organs. Moreover, 
these domestic principles are always fixed within the law, while the international 
‘coordination rules’ are variable, as they are established in treaty norms, and per-
tain to specific international jurisdictional organs, which are autonomous from 
each other. With regard to lis pendens, in international law it has at most inspired 
«une règle dictée par des considérations de correction et de courtoisie internatio-
nale».83 Notwithstanding the opinions of some scholars,84 even res iudicata does 
not seemingly belong to international law. A similar rule may find a place in the 
agreement that two or more Parties stipulate in order to defer a dispute to an in-
ternational tribunal. However, if the Parties are not satisfied with the dispute set-
tlement outcomes, they can decide at any moment to conclude a new agreement 
and submit that same dispute to another organ. That even more demonstrates the 
absence of a proper res iudicata in international law.85  
Be that as it may, with respect to the search for coordination between the Af-
rican Court and the African sub-regional jurisdictional organs, first and foremost, 
the existence of any relevant provision is to be scrutinised.86  
clares that the UN Human Rights Committee shall not consider any communication unless it has as-
certained that the same matter is not being examined under another procedure of international inves-
tigation or settlement. For detailed overviews, see A.A. CANÇADO TRINDADE, “Co-Existence and Co-
Ordination of Mechanisms of International Protection of Human Rights (at Global and Regional Lev-
els)”, in Recueil des cours de l’Academie de droit international de l’Haye 1987, vol. 202, p. 9 ff., and F. 
SALERNO, “Rapporti fra procedimenti concernenti le medesime istanze individuali presso diversi or-
ganismi internazionali di tutela dei diritti umani”, in Rivista di diritto internazionale 1999, p. 363 ff.  
83 See G. TÉNÉKIDÈS, op. cit., p. 526. The majority of contemporary scholars agree that lis pen-
dens does not exist in international law: see, inter alios, K. OELLERS-FRAHM, op. cit., pp. 77-78; M.I.
PAPA, I rapporti tra la Corte internazionale di giustizia e il Consiglio di sicurezza, Padova, 2006, p. 
149 ff., mainly p. 153; C. FOCARELLI, International Law as a Social Construct. The Struggle for Glob-
al Justice, Oxford, 2012, p. 329. 
84 Many authors qualify res iudicata as a general principle of public international law: see B. 
CHENG, General Principles of Law as Applied by International Courts and Tribunals, London, 1953, 
p. 336 ff.; A. CASSESE, Il diritto interno nel processo internazionale, Padova, 1962, pp. 232-235; V.
LOWE, “Res Judicata and the Rule of Law in International Arbitration”, in African Journal of Interna-
tional and Comparative Law 1996, p. 38 ff. Someone else argues that res iudicata is provided by cus-
tomary international law: see A. DEL VECCHIO, Le parti nel processo internazionale, Milano, 1975, p.
252 ff., and Y. SHANY, The Competing Jurisdictions of International Courts and Tribunals, Oxford,
2003, p. 245. Eventually, according to a softer position, A. REINISCH, op. cit., p. 51 ff., argues that
some episodes of the international practice would indicate a general tendency of States to support
the application of res iudicata by international tribunals, at least in some fields of international law.
85 On this point, see accurately A. DAVÌ, L’intervento davanti alla Corte internazionale di giusti-
zia, Napoli, 1984, pp. 156-157. Also see C. FOCARELLI, op. cit., pp. 329-332, who writes that the 
international tribunals spontaneously respect a sort of res iudicata principle, even if a pertaining 
international norm lacks.  
86 Henceforth, I will refer to the African Court and not anymore to the African Commission, 
both for a matter of fluency and because the main coordination problems could arise with regard to 
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The instruments instituting the African sub-regional jurisdictional organs 
never regulate their relationship with the African Court. After all, as already said, 
the stipulating States did not attribute to them any express human rights man-
date. Furthermore, the majority of these organs were created when the African 
Court did not exist yet. Therefore, the statutes of the African sub-regional juris-
dictional organs should not be expected to care about coordination with the Af-
rican Court. From this viewpoint, the ECOWAS Court of Justice represents an 
exception. It is the only African sub-regional jurisdictional organ with a treaty-
based human rights competence. Moreover, the Supplementary Protocol attrib-
uting such competence to the ECOWAS Court of Justice was concluded after the 
African Court Protocol had entered into force. Anyway, a ‘coordination rule’ 
lacks even in that instrument.87  
The African Court Protocol does not contain a proper ‘coordination rule’ ei-
ther. However, it vaguely recalls the domestic principle of res iudicata among the 
admissibility criteria for claims brought by individuals and NGOs.88 In particular, 
the African Court could not receive any application related to a dispute already 
settled in conformity with the principles enshrined in the UN Charter, in the AU 
Constitutive Act or in the African Charter. Although the African Court has never 
interpreted or implemented this rule, its ambiguity and inaccuracy (mainly when 
it mentions the UN principles) make it clear that it could be intended even to the 
detriment of the protection of human rights.89 Moreover, this rule is not exhaus-
tive, as it concerns only cases already settled within the abovementioned systems 
and is never applicable to ongoing related proceedings. 
6. Solutions to Coordinate the African Court with the African Sub-Regional
Jurisdictional Organs in the Light of the Main Legal Doctrine
International comity could be a key to coordinate the African Court with the Af-
rican sub-regional jurisdictional organs. Currently, international comity is often 
the relationship of the sub-regional jurisdictional organs with the African Court, which is an inter-
national jurisdictional organ as well. 
87 Therefore, it is not surprising that the ECOWAS Court of Justice lays claim to autonomy 
from the African Court in the human rights legal discourse. That happened for the first time in 
Koraou v. Niger, cit., paras. 42-43. Then, the ECOWAS Court of Justice confirmed its position in 
Hissène Habré v. Senegal, application no. 07/08, judgment of 18 November 2010; Socio-Economic 
Rights and Accountability Project (SERAP) v. Nigeria and Another, application no. 12/07, judgment 
of 30 November 2010; Simone Ehivet and Michel Gbagbo v. Côte d’Ivoire, application no. 18/11, 
judgment of 22 February 2013. 
88 Indeed, Art. 6, para. 2, of the Ouagadougou Protocol provides that the African Court shall 
rule on the admissibility of cases taking into account Art. 56 of the African Charter. In other words, 
it invokes the admissibility criteria of cases as stated in Art. 56 of the African Charter. 
89 For a very similar opinion, see F. OUGUERGOUZ, “Article 56”, in La Charte africaine des 
droits de l’homme et des peuples et le Protocole y relatif portant création de la Cour africaine des 
droits de l’homme. Commentaire article par article, M. KAMTO (sous la direction de), Bruxelles, 
2011, p. 1024 ff., pp. 1044-1050. 
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invoked as a solution when it is not possible to otherwise organise the relation-
ship between two or more international organs. It envisages that each organ 
should give due consideration to proceedings that are ongoing or to cases that 
have been already settled before other organs. In particular, an author argues that 
international comity is intrinsic to the relationships among international organs, 
thus qualifying it as fixed by an international customary norm. According to this 
scholar, the international organs are only formally autonomous from each other, 
being concretely integrated in a context of ‘intra-systemic interaction’ and basi-
cally applying the same international norms.90 Indeed, such hypothesis does not 
seem to have any effective legal basis and does not rely on clear legal parameters. 
As a matter of fact international comity would resultantly be at the complete dis-
cretion of the international judges.   
Some solutions de iure condendo are also proposed. With specific regard to 
the African human rights context, an author suggests getting inspiration by the 
system of reference for preliminary rulings existing in the EU order. According to 
such idea, the RECs should refer to the African Court for an advisory opinion 
when human rights questions emerge in the disputes submitted to their jurisdic-
tional organs. Art. 4, para. 1, of the Ouagadougou Protocol could turn useful, 
since it admits the possibility that an African intergovernmental organisation rec-
ognised by the AU may ask the African Court to deliver an advisory opinion on 
any legal matter relating to the African Charter or to any other human rights in-
struments.91 However, the troubled African environment and the rivalries fre-
quently existing among the States belonging to the same REC (whose unanimity 
is often necessary in order to let the REC ask the African Court for an advisory 
opinion) make it difficult to achieve such proposal in the near future.  
The legal doctrine recommends some other solutions de iure condendo that, 
notwithstanding their general scope, could be applied even to coordinate the re-
lationships among the African Court and the African sub-regional jurisdictional 
organs. An author advocates the codification of an obligation of international tri-
bunals to know their reciprocal case-law.92 Another author recommends the insti-
tution of a mechanism of information among international tribunals and the or-
ganisation of periodical meetings among international judges.93 Moreover, a 
scholar expressly invites the UN General Assembly to create a subsidiary organ 
in charge of studying and managing the relationships among international juris-
90 See Y. SHANY, op. cit., p. 283 ff. 
91 See M. MUBIALA, op. cit., p. 102. This proposal is shared by M.A. NAMOUNTOUGOU, “La 
saisine du juge international africain des droits de l’homme”, in Revue trimestrielle des droits de 
l’homme 2011, p. 261 ff., mainly p. 279. 
92 See T. BUERGENTHAL, “Proliferation of International Courts and Tribunals: Is It Good or 
Bad?”, in Leiden Journal of International Law 2001, p. 267 ff., in particular p. 274. 
93 These are the conclusive recommendation expressed by Y. KERBRAT, “Conclusion générale”, 
in Forum Shopping et concurrence des procédures contentieuses internationales, Y. KERBRAT (sous la 
direction de), Bruxelles, 2011, p. 299 ff. 
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dictional and ‘quasi-jurisdictional’ organs.94 Furthermore, an interesting proposal 
concerns the establishment of a hierarchy in the international judicial landscape 
attributing an apical position to the International Court of Justice. According to 
such proposal, every international jurisdictional organ could (or should) apply – 
directly or through the UN organs – before the International Court of Justice for 
an advisory opinion in order to resolve any coordination problem with other in-
ternational jurisdictional organs.95 Someone also suggests conferring upon the In-
ternational Court of Justice an express referral jurisdiction.96 One can agree or 
not with such solutions. In any case, they have never been implemented as of yet, 
nor will they probably be.   
7. Relationships Between the African Court and the African Sub-Regional
Jurisdictional Organs: The Proliferation of International Tribunals from an
Optimistic Perspective
As underlined, the idea that the action of the African Court should be coordinat-
ed with that of the African sub-regional jurisdictional organs mostly depends on 
the pessimistic opinion shared by some scholars about the proliferation of inter-
national tribunals. Such phenomenon is qualified as the cause of many problems 
in contemporary international law. Above all, some authors argue that the exist-
ence of several international monitoring bodies fosters the subsequent phenome-
non of forum shopping. They also highlight the risks deriving from conflicting 
dispute settlement outcomes, which in turn entail conflicting interpretations of 
the same international norms. All that would threaten the general coherence of 
the international legal system.97 
However, the international law doctrine does not look at the proliferation of 
international tribunals from a univocal perspective. Some authors assert that such 
proliferation (which should be better called ‘multiplication’)98 does not lead to 
94 See M. BENNOUNA, “How to Cope with the Proliferation of International Courts and Coor-
dinate Their Action”, in Realizing Utopia. The Future of International Law, A. CASSESE (ed.), Ox-
ford, 2012, p. 287 ff., in particular p. 293. 
95 See the speech delivered on 26 October 1999 by Stephen M. Schwebel, former President of 
the International Court of Justice, before the UN General Assembly, available in Cour International 
de Justice – Annuaire 1999-2000, p. 297 ff. For an accurate examination of this proposal, see M.I. 
PAPA, I rapporti, cit., pp. 92-93, 480-482, and the bibliography there quoted. 
96 See A. CASSESE, “The International Court of Justice: It Is High Time to Restyle the Respect-
ed Old Lady”, in Realizing Utopia, cit., p. 239 ff., mainly pp. 245-246. 
97 For a pessimistic assessment of the proliferation of international tribunals, see for instance 
G. HAFNER, “Pros and Cons Ensuing from Fragmentation of International Law”, in Michigan Jour-
nal of International Law 2004, p. 849 ff., and W.T. WORSTER, “Competition and Comity in the
Fragmentation of International Law”, in Brooklyn Journal of International Law 2008, p. 119 ff.
98 The scholars who share a positive opinion about the existence of several tribunals in the in-
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disadvantageous effects. This conclusion seems more persuasive than the previ-
ous one. First of all, the phenomenon of forum shopping is not a real problem: in 
international law, the jurisdictional function is based on the parties’ will, so it is 
clear that in any case the Parties can choose the judge who will settle their dis-
putes. Then, the practice reveals few circumstances of overlapping situations be-
tween two international organs. In addition, such circumstances have triggered 
the debate about the interpretation of the international norms at stake. Given 
that in the context of this debate each international organ has taken in due con-
sideration the case-law of the other, a sort of ‘fertilisation’ has eventually come 
out.99 Basically, the multiplication of international tribunals promotes the evolu-
tion and the ‘vitality’ of international law.100  
This conclusion seems even more correct with respect to international human 
rights law.101 The proliferation of human rights monitoring bodies in Africa is 
paradigmatic to this effect. By way of illustration, had not the ECOWAS Court of 
Justice existed and/or spontaneously extended its material competence, the de-
velopment of international human rights law in Western Africa would have been 
prevented. More precisely, while the African Court has to abide by the limits dic-
tated by all the African States, on the contrary the ECOWAS Court of Justice 
and some other sub-regional jurisdictional organs are free to act without strict 
conditions. In a nutshell, the proliferation of international tribunals has led to a 
protection of human rights that in Western Africa and in some other African re-
gions is stronger than that guaranteed according to the continental standard. 
That happened mainly because some African States are more human rights 
‘friendly’ than others, thus without any coordination between the African Court 
rection de), Paris, 2003, p. 7 ff., p. 13, «dans la langue française contemporaine, le terme de prolifé-
ration a pris une connotation nettement péjorative». 
99 About the topic of ‘fertilisation’ among international tribunals, recently see A.A. CANÇADO
TRINDADE, “Contemporary International Tribunals: Jurisprudential Cross Fertilization in Their 
Common Mission of Realization of Justice”, in The Global Community 2017, p. 217 ff. With specif-
ic regard to ‘fertilisation’ between two human rights courts, see A. DI STASI, “The Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights and the European Court of Human Rights: Towards a Cross Fertiliza-
tion?”, in Ordine internazionale e diritti umani 2014, p. 97 ff.  
100 For an insightful positive assessment of the topic of the proliferation of international tribunals, 
see B. CONFORTI, “Il diritto internazionale che cresce: la moltiplicazione dei tribunali internazionali”, 
in Studi in onore di Vincenzo Starace, Napoli, 2008, vol. I, p. 143 ff.; ID., “Unité et fragmentation du 
droit international”, cit., p. 5 ff. Also see J.I. CHARNEY, “Is International Law Threatened by Multiple 
International Tribunals?”, in Recueil des cours de l’Academie de droit international de l’Haye 1998, vol. 
271, p. 347 ff.; T. BUERGENTHAL, op. cit., p. 272 ff.; C. FOCARELLI, op. cit., p. 328. Subject to some 
specifications, a very similar assessment is also suggested by R. HIGGINS, “A Babel of Judicial Voices? 
Ruminations from the Bench”, in International & Comparative Law Quarterly 2006, p. 797 ff.  
101 See extensively R.B. LILLICH, “Towards the Harmonization of International Human Rights 
Law”, in Recht zwischen Umbruch und Bewahrung. Festschrift für Rudolf Bernhardt, U. BEYERLIN
(Hrsg.), Berlin/Heidelberg, 1995, p. 453 ff. For a similar perspective, also see L. PINESCHI, Diritti 
umani, cit., p. 600 ff. 
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and the ECOWAS Court of Justice or other African sub-regional jurisdictional 
organs. Hence, the necessity to find a coordination appears now overestimated. 
ABSTRACT. An Optimistic Perspective on the Proliferation of Human Rights Monitoring Bodies 
in Africa 
Many human rights monitoring bodies coexist in Africa. At a continental level the African Court 
flanks the African Commission, while at a sub-regional level some jurisdictional organs belonging to 
the Sub-Regional Economic Communities have progressively extended their competence to human 
rights disputes. Whether a coordination among these bodies is effectively needed mostly depends 
on the evaluation of the proliferation of international tribunals from a broader perspective. In this 
paper, my aim is to contribute to demonstrating that, if one regards the proliferation of internation-
al tribunals as a positive phenomenon, the said need decreases or disappears. For these purposes, 
first of all, I introduce the African Commission and the African Court. Thereafter, I focus on the 
development of the human rights competence of the three most representative sub-regional juris-
dictional organs (the SADC Tribunal, the EAC Court of Justice and the ECOWAS Court of Jus-
tice). After ascertaining the lack of provisions governing the relationships between these organs, I 
dwell on the methods of coordination proposed by some scholars. In the last paragraph, I suggest 
that such coordination is not actually necessary. 
Keywords: proliferation of international tribunals; overlapping jurisdictions; coordination rules 
among international courts and tribunals; African human rights system; African Court on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights; African sub-regional jurisdictional organs. 
